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 Starting from the seminal work of Berle and Means [1932], the conflict between
 remote shareholders and knowledgeable managers of firms is prominent in modern
 organization theory. In this context, a growing body of research has in recent years
 dealt with the efficiency of alternative corporate governance systems such as the Anglo-
 Saxon market based system and the Continental-European bank based system, when
 it comes to monitoring corporate management. The empirical evidence on this issue
 is rather mixed.1
 In general, corporate governance systems are characterized by the following four
 features that, along with executive compensation, affect the top managers' decisions.
 First, legal protection of shareholders enhances the possibility that investors are
 able to use their voting rights and get their share of the cash flow [Shleifer and
 Vishny, 1997]. Investor protection is particularly strong in the Anglo-Saxon regime
 but the Continental-European system is characterized by a wide range of institu-
 tions that restrict the control rights of shareholders. In some countries (such as the
 Netherlands) one can actually observe anti-investor protection instead of legal pro-
 tection of shareholders. Second, concentrated ownership (or concentrated
 debtholdership, for that matter) increases the incentive for the (large) shareholders
 (debtholders) to monitor management effectively. La Porta et al., [1998] show that
 concentrated ownership seems to be the norm around the world. Apart from the Anglo-
 Saxon regime in the United States and the UK, where legal protection of shareholder
 rights is strong, most other countries have rather concentrated ownership. Third,
 the market (for corporate control) may discipline managers. Here the evidence is
 that outside the United States and the UK (the Anglo-Saxon regime) hostile take-
 overs do not take place at a large scale. In almost one hundred percent of all cases,
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 takeovers in Europe are grounded on strategic arguments rather than the poor per-
 formance of management. Fourth, managers may be disciplined by the governance
 structure of their firms, in particular the structure and characteristics of the board(s).
 Particularly, in regimes such as the Continental-European system where investors
 are not well protected, the company boards represent one of the few remaining op-
 tions to control management.
 To conclude, the aforementioned observations suggest that in the Anglo-Saxon
 regime shareholders may control management decision making through the board
 and through the market for corporate control. In the Continental-European system,
 alternately, shareholder control, in the absence of the market for corporate control
 and legal investor protection, can only take place through company boards [Boot and
 Macy, 1999]. Hence, we expect shareholders in both corporate governance regimes to
 be seriously interested in board characteristics when it comes to the accountability of
 management for corporate performance. But also from an academic point of view the
 nexus between board characteristics and corporate performance is relevant. Follow-
 ing the seminal paper of Fama and Jensen [1983], boards can be effective mecha-
 nisms to monitor top management on behalf of dispersed shareholders. Boards effec-
 tuate management appointment, dismissal, suspension, and reward. Therefore, the
 characteristics of boards are relevant to corporate performance.
 In this paper we address the nexus between board characteristics and corporate
 performance for the Netherlands. The Dutch system of corporate governance repre-
 sents a unique combination of characteristics of the market-based Anglo-Saxon re-
 gime and the bank-based Continental-European regime. Moreover, it is particularly
 suited to analyze the nexus of board characteristics, management decisions and cor-
 porate performance since the distinguishing feature of the Dutch system is the two-
 tier board structure consisting of a management board (Raad van Bestuur) and a
 supervisory board (Raad van Commissarissen). Decision management is assigned to
 the Dutch management board. Decision control is largely taken over by the supervi-
 sory board, whose members are generally appointed through co-option.
 BOARD ROLES AND CHARACTERISTICS AND CORPORATE
 PERFORMANCE
 Corporate boards fulfill three roles [Goodstein, Gautam, and Boeker, 1994]. First,
 there's an institutional role. Boards provide a link between the organization and its
 environment and secure critical resources [Williamson, 1996]. Second, boards have
 an internal governance and monitoring role and discipline or remove ineffective man-
 agement teams [Barnhart et al., 1994]. The third role of boards is in strategic deci-
 sion making [Fama and Jensen, 1983]. In this paper we focus on the second role.
 Monks and Minow [1995] survey the literature on this topic and indicate that board
 monitoring can indeed improve the quality of managers' decisions.
 Various aspects play a role in increasing the monitoring role of boards. One con-
 cerns the size of the boards. Haleblian and Finkelstein [1993] argue that the main
 advantage of a large board is that a large group has more problem-solving capabili-
 ties. It is likely, however, that very large boards are ineffective. Jensen notes that
 "[K]eeping boards small can help improve their performance" [1993, 865]. Lipton and
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 Lorsch [1992] even argue that norms of behavior in the boardroom can become dys-
 functional. Zahra and Pearce [1989] argue that there might be a threshold where
 board size may negatively affect company performance. Empirical evidence on this
 issue is rather scarce, however. A notable exception is Yermack [1996] who finds
 strong support for a negative relationship between firm performance and board size
 of U.S. firms.
 A second variable of interest is board composition. From the perspective of solv-
 ing the Berle-Means agency problem between management and shareholders appoint-
 ing outsiders seems to be the natural solution. Byrd and Hickman [1992] argue that
 high-caliber CEOs may appoint independent directors to please shareholders with
 an illusion of active monitoring. The empirical evidence on the relation between firm
 performance and board composition is again mixed. Rosenstein and Wyatt [1990] find
 evidence for a positive impact of the number of outsiders; Bayesinger and Butler
 [1985] come to a similar conclusion. Hermalin and Weisbach [1991], Bhagat and
 Black [1997; 1998], and Dalton et al. [1998] do not find a robust relationship. Note
 again that all the studies concern U.S. firms.2
 A third variable affecting monitoring performance is board remuneration. If boards
 own stock, their interest in monitoring management is aligned with the interest of
 external shareholders. Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny [1988] for U.S. firms indeed find
 significant, but non-monotonic associations between different levels of director stock
 ownership and Tobin's Q [McConnel and Servaes, 1990].
 Apart from these three characteristics some commentators argue that the moni-
 toring role could benefit from strong procedures for reviewing management, a reduc-
 tion of the power of the CEO to appoint new members, and so on. These are to a large
 extent derivatives of the first three issues.
 In our study of Dutch boards, our main hypothesis is that corporate performance
 depends on the quality of monitoring as proxied by size of the board, the number of
 outsiders in the board, and remuneration of board members. In this respect, we con-
 centrate primarily on the size of the board (both manager and supervisory board) and
 the composition of the supervisory board. We also report our findings on stock owner-
 ship by board members, although ownership of stock by board members is limited in
 the Netherlands (about 3.5 percent for management board members and only 1.3
 percent for supervisory board members on average in our sample, which is compa-
 rable to the figures van Oijen [2000] reports). Finally, we report our findings on the
 remuneration per member of both the management and the supervisory board.
 DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BOARD COMPOSITION
 Contrary to the U.S. regime, the focal point of the Dutch regime of corporate
 governance is the two-tier board structure consisting of a management board (Raad
 van Bestuur) in charge of the day-to-day operations of the firm and a supervisory
 board (Raad van Commissarissen). The scope of influence of the supervisory board
 depends on the legal regime the firm adopts. The firm has three options . First, Dutch
 firms are forced by law to adopt the so-called structural regime (Structuurregeling),
 when they satisfy the following conditions: (1) the firm is a limited liability company
 (Naamloze Vennootschap), (2) subscribed capital exceeds 25 million guilders (approxi-
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 mately US$12 million), (3) employment in the Netherlands exceeds 100, and
 employees are represented by a works council. The supervisory board (which is obliga-
 tory in this case) has three primary tasks: (1) to appoint, monitor, suspend, and dis-
 miss members of the management board, (2) to draft the annual financial statement
 for presentation at the annual shareholders meeting, and (3) to monitor and ratify
 major business decisions proposed by the management board concerning, for example,
 expansions, acquisitions, restructuring, or financing. That is, the incumbent mem-
 bers of the supervisory board appoint members of the supervisory board for four-year
 terms by co-option. An individual cannot serve on both the supervisory and manage-
 ment board of the same company. The two-tier board structure in the Netherlands
 differs substantially from that in Germany, where the supervisory board is appointed
 by both the workers and the shareholders and exerts substantial independent influ-
 ence on management. The close ties between management and supervisory boards
 make the Dutch two-tier system somewhat similar to the U.S. system, where execu-
 tive managers sit on the board of directors and the CEO often chairs the board of
 directors (CEO-duality).
 The second legal option is used by firms that meet the criteria for the structural
 regime, but are majority foreign owned. They adopt the mitigated structural regime
 (Gewijzigde Structuurregeling). Under the legal regime, the (obligatory and co-opted)
 supervisory board's responsibilities for appointing, suspending, and dismissing mem-
 bers of the management board and drafting the annual financial statement are trans-
 ferred to the annual shareholders meeting, enhancing investor protection. Their main
 task is to ratify major business decisions. Public limited liability companies that do
 not meet the above criteria adopt the third option, the common legal regime, where a
 supervisory board is optional. If a supervisory board is in place, its members are
 appointed at the annual shareholders meeting, and its main responsibility is to ratify
 major management decisions. All other important decisions, especially the appoint-
 ment of the management board, are made at the annual meeting of the shareholders.
 Paradoxically the structural regime and the co-option principle in particular al-
 lows managers to entrench more than in the other two regimes. In reality, the man-
 agement board has a very large influence on appointments to the supervisory board
 [van der Goot and van het Kaar, 1997]. Moreover, the supervisory board takes deci-
 sions otherwise made at the annual shareholder meeting. The opportunity to adopt
 the structural regime voluntarily can be seen as a major device to protect manage-
 ment from investor pressure (defense instrument). About 25 percent of the firms in
 our sample have voluntarily adopted the structural regime. So, board structure is
 important in the system of Dutch corporate governance and instrumental in anti-
 investor protection (especially through the co-option principle).
 For our analysis this implies that the issues of board size and composition are
 intertwined with the other elements in the game between management and share-
 holders. We therefore briefly describe alternative instruments of legal protection of
 shareholders and their use. First, we list other legal instruments that limit share-
 holder influence. Second, we discuss ownership concentration and the role of finan-
 cial intermediaries.
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 There are three main additional instruments. First, firms are allowed (with per-
 mission by the shareholders meeting beforehand) to issue preference shares to a
 friendly trust office with the same voting rights as ordinary shares but with a fixed
 dividend payout with priority. Preference shares may be sold at nominal value to the
 trust office with the obligation to pay only 25 percent of the amount up front. In our
 sample of 94 Dutch listed non-financial firms 66 percent of all firms use this form of
 anti-investor protection. Second, firms can separate cash flow and control rights us-
 ing tradable depository receipts. A trust (administrative) office administers tradable
 depository receipts when issued or initiates a certification process where tradable
 depository receipts are exchanged for ordinary shares. The tradable depository re-
 ceipts entitle the holder to cash flow rights (dividends), but control (voting) rights
 reside within the administrative office. In our sample 32 percent of the firms adopt
 this type of protection. Third, firms can issue priority shares and curtail voting power
 (in 24 percent of our sample). Priority shares carry special voting rights on matters
 such as proposing or preventing the appointment of particular new members of the
 management and supervisory boards, approving the issue of ordinary shares, merger
 approval, liquidation of the company or changing the articles of association [Gelauff
 and den Broeder, 1996]. The structural regime and the issue of priority shares are
 almost never combined, which underscores the argument that both are alternative
 instruments of anti-investor protection. In our sample only 13 of 94 firms do not use
 any of the instruments listed above. This clearly indicates that anti-investor/takeover
 protection is a rule rather than an exception in the Netherlands.
 Two additional control mechanisms are relevant for our analysis. In the first
 place, we look at ownership concentration. Following Shleifer and Vishny [1997] own-
 ership concentration might be a substitute for legal instruments. Since shareholders
 are not well protected in the Netherlands one might expect a large degree of share-
 holder concentration. Indeed, equity ownership is more concentrated than in the
 United States. De Jong, Kabir, Marra, and Roell [1998] find for the 137 listed Dutch
 firms in 1995 that the average largest stake is about 28 percent and the second
 largest stake 9 percent.3 However, shares are largely held by foreigners (approxi-
 mately 50 percent) and financial institutions in general do not have large amount of
 shares (insurance companies and pension funds are somewhat of an exception
 [Cantrijn, Leunink, and Kabir, 1993]). This implies that in the Dutch case monitor-
 ing of managers by large shareholders is rare, which might lead to free-rider prob-
 lems. Note furthermore that even in spite of (more) concentrated ownership, Dutch
 anti-investor protection (including the institutional features of the structural regime)
 generally precludes that management is seriously disciplined by the stock market.
 The second instrument is control by financial institutions, banks and other fi-
 nancial institutions. As in Germany (and in contrast with the United States), Dutch
 banks are allowed to hold equity and firms have bankers on the supervisory board.
 Moreover, in the Netherlands pension funds and insurance companies are suppliers
 of financial capital. If a bank is an important provider of debt, it might also want to
 exert control through equity stakes or a position on the supervisory board. De Jong,
 Kabir, Marra, and Roell [1998] report that for the 137 listed Dutch firms, banks held
 7.2 percent of the shares, pension funds 0.6 percent and other financial institutions
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 15.5 percent. Apart from their role as shareholder and creditor, financial institutions
 are also linked with firms through their representation on supervisory boards (and
 vice versa). About 25 percent of the firms have direct or indirect networking relation-
 ships with financial institutions.
 Concluding, when it comes to monitoring management in the Netherlands, su-
 pervisory boards are important. Moreover, board size and composition cannot be sepa-
 rated from the general setting of corporate governance. Our analysis of the impact of
 board size and composition on corporate performance therefore takes account of both
 the legal instruments to shield management from shareholder pressure and the other
 control instruments, especially the influence of financial institutions. In the next sec-
 tion we discuss the data we use to measure the above-mentioned variables.
 DATA DESCRIPTION
 We use data for 1996 on 94 Dutch listed non-financial (mainly manufacturing)
 firms. These firms can be classified into 8 industries: administrative, chemicals, con-
 struction, electric equipment, foods, metals, retail, and transport. The sample includes
 about 60 percent of the firms listed at the Amsterdam Stock Exchange (AEX). From
 the AMADEUS data set of 200,000 European firms we obtain the balance sheet and
 income and loss-statement variables (the Dutch version of the data set is called
 REACH). The Dutch financial newspaper Het Financieele Dagblad (Handboek
 Nederlandse Beursfondsen, 1996/1997) provides data for market values, dividends
 and short-term bank loans, which are not included in AMADEUS. Although
 AMADEUS gives data for 165 Dutch firms, we focus on manufacturing and skip ser-
 vices to achieve some homogeneity in the sample. Subsequently, we only include firms
 that register their activity within the Netherlands only, which, for instance, excludes
 Royal Dutch Shell. This gives us a final sample of 94 firms. The descriptive statistics
 are based on this sample of 94 firms. For the regression analyses we excluded two
 more firms because of outliers in the bank-debt variable.
 One of the issues in analyzing firm performance is the choice of the performance
 measure. There are mainly two categories of indicators. First, we have the account-
 ing measures, the traditional ones like return on assets, equity, investment, and sales,
 and the more modern concepts like cash flow return on investment and economic
 value added. Second, one can measure performance using market data. In this class
 we have Tobin's Q (and all its related measurement problems), the market-to-book
 ratio, or the market-adjusted stock market returns. We use one accounting indicator
 which we label PERFORM, defined as the standardized arithmetic average of return
 on assets, sales, and equity, and the market indicator market-to-book ratio . From our
 data we cannot compute the market value of debt, which makes the computation of
 Tobin's Q impossible.
 The variables are defined in the following tables. Table 1 gives performance indi-
 cators and control variables. We report the mean, median (to account for the under-
 representation of the large firms) and standard deviation. As can be seen from the
 mean and median of total assets, the table shows that the size distribution of the
 firms is skewed. The correlation coefficient between the accounting indicator PER-
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 Variable Mean Median Deviation Variable Mean Median Deviation
 ROA 9.75 9.21 4.75 TA 2674 482 7915
 ROS 6.92 6.33 4.71 L 61.59 62.49 12.34
 ROE 11.72 9.83 5.01 CFAITA 16.61 16.41 6.80
 PERFORM 0.00 -0.07 0.87 DIVIDICFA 17.55 13.05 18.92
 MB 1.98 1.51 1.60 Cv(SALES) 0.18 0.13 0.13
 Cv(ROA) 6.64 0.31 58.11
 DYN 0.34 0 0.48
 DIV 1.99 1.70 2.04
 SSPI 0.00 -0.15 1.00
 The data refer to 94 Dutch listed non-financial (manufacturing firms). The source of the data is AMADEUS.
 ROA = before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of total assets;
 ROS = before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of sales;
 ROE = before-tax profits plus financial expense as a percentage of equity capital;
 PERFORM = arithmetic average of standardized ROA, ROS, and ROE;
 MB = market to book value of equity;
 TA = total assets minus depreciation;
 L = leverage defined as total assets minus equity capital as a fraction of total assets;
 CFA = adjusted cash flow, defined as cash flow plus depreciation;
 CFAITA = cash flow minus depreciation as a percentage of total assets minus depreciation;
 DIVIDÍ CFA = Dividend paid as a percentage of adjusted cash flow CFA;
 Cv(SALES) = coefficient of variation of sales, defined as the mean over the standard deviation of sales;
 Cv(ROA) = coefficient of variation of sales, defined as the mean over the standard deviation of the return
 on assets (ROA);
 DYN = a dummy variable, indicating a stable (=0) or dynamic (=1) environment. If either the coefficient of
 variation of sales (as a proxy of demand uncertainty) or the return on assets (ROA) (as a proxy for profit
 uncertainty) is bigger than 0.5 we define the environment to be dynamic (DYN=1);
 DIV = diversification, defined by the percentage of non-core activities at the two-digit level. The total
 number of activities is 58, as defined by the Dutch Chamber of Commerce BIK-classification;
 SSPI = standardized annual stock-price increase.
 FORM and the market indicator market-to-book ratio equals 0.58. This relatively
 small correlation coefficient makes it necessary to analyze the board-performance
 nexus for both performance indicators. Table 1 gives the data on the conditioning
 variables (mainly derived from balance sheet and income data). The table includes
 data on total assets, leverage, cash flow, dividend, environmental uncertainty facing
 the firm, corporate diversification, and stock price increase. We use these variables to
 condition the performance indicators in the regression model. Dividend outlays are
 taken as instrumental variables. One can argue that this is the ultimate need of
 shareholders. In the regressions with two variables to be instrumented (insiders and
 outsiders) we use the dividend payout ratio as an additional instrumental variable
 [Chirinko et al., 2000]. Table 2 shows the governance variables. We give the size of
 the management board, the size of the supervisory board, the percentage of supervi-
 sory board members with ties to more than one firm, equity ownership by members of
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 Variable Mean Median Deviation Variable Mean Median Deviation
 RVB 2.95 3 1.53 AIP1 0.66 1 0.48
 RVC 4.95 5 1.83 AIP2 0.33 0 0.47
 OUT 84.30 100 19.94 AIP3 0.24 0 0.43
 EQRVB 3.47 0 12.83 AIP4 0.25 0 0.44
 EQRVC 1.33 0 7.51 CONCP 25.70 19.07 21.01
 REMUNRVB 941.18 875 667.85 BANK 5.34 3.05 7.55
 REMUNRVC 35.48 32 18.54 PINS 4.39 1.22 5.37
 NETWORK1 0.14 0 0.35
 NETWORK2 0.14 0 0.36
 The data refer to 94 Dutch listed non-financial (manufacturing firms). Sources of the data are: Bestuurders
 and Commissarissen [1997] and Handboek Nederlandse Beursfondsen [1996/1997].
 The governance indicators refer to 94 Dutch listed non-financial (manufacturing firms). Source of the
 data is Chirinko et al. [2000].
 RVB = number of members of the management board;
 RVC = number of members of the supervisory board;
 OUT = number of outside members of the supervisory board, that is the number of board members who
 hold board positions at other companies;
 EQRVB = percentage of equity ownership by members of the management board;
 EQRVC = percentage of equity ownership by members of the supervisory board;
 REMUNRVB = remuneration (base salary) of a member of the management board (57 obs. Thousands of
 guilders);
 REMUNRVC = remuneration (base salary) of a member of the supervisory board (73 obs. Thousands of
 guilders).
 AIP1 = 1 if a firm issued preference shares, else AIPl=0;
 AIP2 = 1 if the percentage of shares issued as certificates is equal to or greater than 50 percent, else AIP2 = 0;
 AIP3 = 1 if a firm issued priority shares, else AIP3=0;
 AIP4 - 1 if a firm is not required to implement the structural regime, but does so voluntarily, else AIP4=0;
 CONCP = percentage of shares owned by the largest shareholder;
 BANK = percentage of shares owned by a bank;
 PINS = percentage of shares owned by a pension fund or insurance company;
 NETWORK1 = 1, if a firm's supervisory board contains (a) member(s) of the management board of a
 financial intermediary, or if a member of the management board of the firm sits on a financial intermediary's
 supervisory board;
 NETWORK2 = 1, is a firm's supervisory board contains (a) member(s) of the supervisory board of a finan-
 cial intermediary.
 the management board, equity ownership by members of the supervisory board, and
 total remuneration per member of both the management and the supervisory board.
 The average size of the management board is 3; supervisory boards have 5 members
 on average. A large majority of supervisory board members hold positions at board in
 other firms, which illustrates the intricate networking ties in the Dutch corporate
 system. Networking can be beneficial to a firm; it might, for example, facilitate ac-
 cess to resources. Alternatively, it can negatively affect corporate performance as
 outsiders do not only have the interest of the firm to look after. For instance, super-
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 visory board members who also hold positions at banks can be relatively risk averse
 if they also have to guard the interests of the bank as a supplier of debt. Note that
 networking is particularly facilitated by the Dutch system of co-option. The remu-
 neration data clearly show the difference between the day-to-day tasks of the man-
 agement board and the more incidental activities of the supervisory board. The aver-
 age management board member earned almost 1 million guilders (about half a mil-
 lion U.S. dollars) in 1996. Note that we don't have separate data on CEO remunera-
 tion. Table 2 also shows alternative governance indicators (the instrumental vari-
 ables in our analysis), for example legal anti-investor protection indicators (AIP1 to
 AIP4), the concentration of ownership as measured by the percentage of shares held
 by the largest owner, the equity holdings by banks and institutional investors, and
 indicators of networking relationships between non-financial and financial firms.
 Almost all firms use some kind of legal anti-investor protection. The correlation be-
 tween financial ownership and networking is not overwhelming but nevertheless
 substantial.
 To provide some perspective, we compare the aforementioned characteristics of
 Dutch firms with those of U.S. firms, since most studies of boards deal with U.S.
 firms. The following observations can be made. First, Dutch firms are smaller on
 average than U.S. firms. Bartelsman [2001] reports that measured by the number of
 employees, U.S. firms are on average four times bigger than Dutch companies. Sec-
 ond, Yermack [1996] reports an average size of U.S. boards of 12 members. The aver-
 age number of members of the management and supervisory board combined for Dutch
 firms in our sample is 8. Hence, Dutch "boards" on average are two-thirds the size of
 U.S. boards. However, if we strictly arithmetically correct for the size-differential
 between United States and Dutch companies, "boards" in the Netherlands are con-
 siderably bigger than in the United States (that is the implied "size-adjusted" num-
 ber for Dutch "boards" would be 32!). Third, Yermack [1996] reports that the per-
 centage of outsiders on U.S. boards equals 0.54. Given that only outsiders are al-
 lowed in Dutch supervisory boards, we can conclude that the percentage of outsiders
 in Dutch "boards" is somewhat higher (62.5 percent). Finally, non-natural manage-
 ment turnover rates in countries like Germany and the Netherlands are generally
 found to be somewhat smaller. Kaplan [1994a] reports a 10 percent turnover rate for
 Germany and van Oijen [2000] finds 8 percent for the Netherlands. Franks et al.
 [1998] report 14 percent for the UK, and Kaplan [1994b] finds 12 percent for the
 United States. On the other hand, Yermack [1996] reports 8.3 percent of director
 turnover (percent of board per year).
 RESEARCH METHOD
 A typical problem in estimating the nexus between performance and board char-
 acteristics is the endogeneity of both groups of variables. Following Demsetz and
 Lehn [1985], it can be argued that if a governance structure affects firm performance
 (and there is an optimal structure) and if the choice of this structure is endogenous
 (like the size of the board), value-maximizing firms will choose the optimal structure.
 In that case, controlling for other (conditioning) variables would imply that there is
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Fri, 08 Mar 2019 12:31:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 50 EASTERN ECONOMIC JOURNAL
 no variation in the values of the performance and governance variables. The result
 would be that it is not possible to identify a relationship between performance and
 governance variables by the data (see also above).
 Only if firms fail to optimize their governance structure, are we able to observe
 and identify the relevant parameters. Moreover, if firms are constrained, for example
 by other variables indicating governance issues, we can use those variables to instru-
 ment the estimation of the nexus between corporate performance and board charac-
 teristics. This would at least statistically solve the endogeneity problem mentioned
 earlier. Following Hermalin and Weisbach [2001, 10-11] we can explain our method
 in the following way. Typically, the empirical research on the impact of board vari-
 ables on performance can be based on the following model.
 (1) pt=ac.+e
 (2) c = pat+%
 where p = corporate performance, c = board characteristics variables (size and com-
 position), a = (other) governance variables, t = time, a/3 are parameters, e and rj are
 error terms. To deal with the endogeneity problem in this simultaneous system, we
 use the Instrumental Variable approach. As instruments (a) we take the other gover-
 nance variables of Table 4, such as preference shares issued by a firm or the percent-
 age of shares issued as certificates (no voting rights) or priority shares issued by
 firms (see above for a complete description of governance indicators). The reported
 estimation results below can be taken as the regression results of the first equation
 of system (1), using instrumental variables that come from equation(2).
 RESULTS
 Our estimation strategy runs as follows. We use two dependent variables, the
 accounting indicator PERFORM, the weighted accounting index, and the market-to-
 book ratio of equity capital. Following the two-tier regime, we estimate two classes of
 models for these dependent variables. One class contains the estimates for the man-
 agement board indicator and one class for the supervisory board indicators. For both
 boards we analyze the impact of size, equity ownership, and remuneration. For the
 supervisory board we also estimate the impact of the number of outsiders on the
 board. Note that our definition of outsiders is restricted to supervisory board mem-
 bers that hold board positions at other firms (interlocking directorates). Furthermore,
 note that the management board of Dutch firms is largely involved in decision man-
 agement and has a substantially weaker decision control role than the board of direc-
 tors in the U.S. firms. The latter is given to the supervisory board.
 We estimate performance models that include board characteristics as well as
 variables that condition for "normal" corporate performance as the independent vari-
 able. Note that in the statistical approach of this paper, the conditioning variables
 are only taken as indicators of the actual variables of the "true" structural corporate
 performance model. In particular, it is not implied that our set of conditioning vari-
 ables characterizes the "true" structural corporate performance model. The condi-
This content downloaded from 129.125.148.19 on Fri, 08 Mar 2019 12:31:44 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
 CORPORATE PERFORMANCE IN THE NETHERLANDS 5 1
 tioning variables proxy for three classes of corporate performance. The first is prod-
 uct markets performance (size, cash flow, and diversification). Second is financial
 market performance (financial structure, share price increases). Third is product mar-
 ket uncertainty (coefficients of variation). Finally, we use industry dummies to take
 account of the industry-specific characteristics of the performance model.
 The conditioning variables are the following:
 • size of the firm: proxied by the log of total assets;
 • financial structure: proxied by leverage;
 • cash flow generated by the firm;
 • diversification of the firm: proxied by the number of out-of-core acivities of the firm;
 • uncertainty faced by the firm: measured by the coefficient of variation of cash
 flows and return on assets (ROA);
 • share price increases (standardized);
 • industry dummies: in total 8 sectors are included (administrative, chemicals, con-
 struction, electric equipment, foods, metals, retail, and transport).
 We estimate equation (1) as :
 (3) P = 60 + 61 logCRVB) + 62 log(TA) + 63 L + 64 CFA/TA
 + b5DIV+b6DYN+b7SSPI + XdjINDj + e
 where P = PERFORM or MB; logCRVB) = logarithm of the size of the management
 board; log(TA) = logarithm of total assets minus depreciation; L = leverage,
 CFA/TA = ratio of cash flow minus depreciation and total assets minus depreciation;
 DIV = indicator of diversification; DYN = dummy variable indicating uncertainty;
 SSPI = standardized share price increase; INDj = 1, if the firm is industry j, else
 INDj = 0.e = residual; bi and dj are parameters to be estimated.
 We have basically two sets of variables under the control of the firm (perfor-
 mance and board size/composition). Given our description of Dutch corporate gover-
 nance and our discussion of the endogeneity problem in the preceding section, we
 consider the choice of board characteristics to be intertwined with other governance
 issues (the second equation of system 1), such as the legal variables, concentration of
 ownership, and control by financial institutions through ownership and networking
 or even directly via dividend outlays. Therefore, we instrument the board variables
 with the following factors (see Table 2 for definitions):
 • anti-investor protection: we use four indicators: AIP1 indicating priority shares,
 AIP2 indicating tradable depository receipts, AIP3 indicating priority shares, AIP4
 indicating the voluntary choice for the structural regime;
 • ownership concentration: blockholding by the largest shareholder;
 • ownership by banks and institutional investors;
 • network relationships between the board members of non-financial and financial
 firms;
 • dividend outlays.
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 TABLE 3
 Estimation Results for the Management Board and
 the Supervisory Board
 Management Board Supervisory Board
 PERFORM MB PERFORM MB
 Board variable
 LogiRVB) 0.228 0.506 -2.221a -1.902b
 Log(RVC) (0.508) (0.594) (0.971) (1.022)
 Conditioning
 Variables -0.033 -0.029 0.392a 0.391a
 Log(TA) (0.097) (0.119) (0.182) (0.188)
 L -0.012a 0.016a -0.012a 0.016a
 (0.005) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008)
 CFAITA 0.022 0.012 0.036a 0.030
 (0.014) (0.019) (0.018) (0.022)
 DIV 0.028 -0.001 0.028 -0.007
 (0.046) (0.068) (0.057) (0.062)
 DYN -0.578a -0.574a -0.345 -0.408b
 (0.153) (0.204) (0.214) (0.222)
 SSPI 0.355a 0.236b 0.385a 0.262a
 (0.144) (0.153) (0.110) (0.151)
 Constant 0.719a 1.131 2.115 1.376
 (0.316) (1.011) (1.768) (0.936)
 Number of firms 92 92 92 92
 R2 0.521 0.355 0.271 0.356
 RSS 27.360 65.674 41.097 65.617
 a. significant at 95 percent confidence level.
 b. significant at 90 percent confidence level.
 The parameter estimates are based on the following equation: P = 60 + (61 logCRVB), 61 logCRVC)) + 62
 log(TA) + 63 L + 64 CFAITA + 65 DIV + 66 DYN + 67 SSPI + X dj INDj + e.
 We instrument \og(RVB) (columns 2 and 3) and (\og(RVC) (columns 4 and 5) by AIP1, AIP2, AIP3, AIP4,
 CONCP, BANK, PINS, NETWORKl and NETWORK2. P is either PERFORM or market-to-book MB, the
 other variables are defined in Tables 1-3, INDj refers to the industry dummy variables (8 industries in
 total), e is a disturbance term, 6i's and dfs are parameters, estimated by Instrumental Variable estima-
 tion. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastic-consistent. We list the adjusted R2 and the re-
 sidual sum of squares and the number of observations. Industry dummy parameters are not reported.
 In line with equation (2), we assume that these variables might affect the decisions
 on the board characteristics to such an extent that we may observe the relation be-
 tween performance and board characteristics (equation (1)).
 Table 3 (management board panel) shows the results of equation (3). We give the
 parameter estimates for the conditioning variables only. Table 3 shows that leverage
 and uncertainty affect both performance measures. The size of the management board
 has no impact on performance, however. This result does not come as a surprise,
 since the Dutch management board is small on average and is focused on day-to-day
 operations. Experimenting with higher-order terms does not lead to any significant
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 result, which leads us to conclude that the size of the management board is not re-
 flected in performance.
 Next, we analyze the more interesting supervisory board characteristics. First,
 we estimate the analogue of equation (1) with logCRVC) replacing log(i?VB). Table 3
 (supervisory board panel) gives the results.
 From Table 3 (supervisory board panel) we can observe that the size of the super-
 visory board has a negative impact on performance (especially PERFORM, but also
 MB at the 90 percent confidence level). Our results imply support for inefficiencies in
 Dutch supervisory boards in line with Yermack's [1996] results for U.S. board size.
 Moreover, because Dutch corporate law requires that only outsiders, (that is, non-
 management directors can be members of supervisory boards), Table 3 also reveals a
 negative relationship between the increased involvement of outsiders (non-manag-
 ers) and corporate performance in Dutch corporate governance.
 Subsequently, we analyze supervisory board composition. We split the size vari-
 able into two components. The first component refers to the number of directors who
 are only a member of the supervisory board of one particular firm. We refer to them
 as insiders. The second components consists of directors who are supervisory board
 member of a particular firm but also hold a board position in at least one other com-
 pany. We refer to those members as outsiders. In our interpretation outsiders reveal
 whether or not supervisory board members (and thus firms) are involved in network-
 ing relationships. To take account of the difference between insiders and outsiders
 equation (4) can be specified as follows:
 (4) P = 60 + 61 log(l+(l-OC/T/100)Xl?VC) + 62 log(Of/T/100 xRVC)
 + 63 log(TA) +64 L + 65 CFAITA + 66 DIV + 67 DYN + 68 SSPI
 + ìdjINDj + e
 where OUT represents the percentage share oí outsiders, so:(l-Of7T/100)xRVC =
 number of inside members (INSIDERS); OUT/lOOxRVC = number of outsiders.
 We transformed the number of insiders by log(l+INSIDERS) to avoid a loss of
 observations (there are quite a few boards with outsiders only). Table 4 gives the
 estimation results. Note that we included one additional instrument (dividend to cash
 flow: DWCFA).
 Table 4 shows that the number of outsiders negatively affects firm performance.
 It might be the case that management boards indeed influence the appointment of
 members of the supervisory boards, in firms under the structural regime that do not
 heavily control management's activities. Through the system of co-option it might
 even be true that friendly persons are given jobs (and remuneration) for not monitor-
 ing activities.
 Subsequently, we analyze equity ownership by both members of the manage-
 ment board and by members of the supervisory board. Ownership by management
 board members is not widespread. For 9 firms members of the management board
 have ownership above 5 percent of the total equity capital; for the supervisory board
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 TABLE 4
 Estimation Results Supervisory Board: Outsiders versus Insiders
 PERFORM MB
 Board Variables
 Log(l+(l-Ot/T/100)x RVC) -0.562 -0.339
 (0.484) (0.662)
 Log(OUT/100x RVC) -1.591a -1.794a
 (0.656) (0.744)
 Conditioning Variables
 Log(TA) 0.323a 0.401a
 (0.118) (0.150)
 L -0.010 0.018a
 (0.006) (0.008)
 CFA/TA 0.039a 0.029
 (0.017) (0.024)
 DIV 0.022 -0.013
 (0.052) (0.066)
 DYN -0.422a -0.464a
 (0.194) (0.226)
 SSPI 0.365a 0.221
 (0.138) (0.176)
 Constant 0.404 0.744
 (0.604) (0.904)
 Number of firms 92 92
 R2 0.316 0.225
 RSS 38.555 77.894
 a. significant at 95 percent confidence level.
 The parameter estimates are based on the following equation: P = 60 + 61 \og(l+(l-OUT/100)xRVC) + 62
 \og(OUT/100xRVC) + 63 log(TA) +64 L + 65 CFA/TA + 66 DIV + 67 DYN + 68 SSPI + Xdj INDj + e.
 We instrument log(l+(l-OUT/100)xRVC) and log(OUT/100xRVC) by AIP1,AIP2,AIP3,AIP4, CONCP,
 BANK, PINS, NETWORK1 and NETWORK2, and DIVCFA. P is either PERFORM or market-to-book
 MB, the other variables are defined in Tables 1-3, INDj refers to the industry dummy variables (8 indus-
 tries in total), e is a disturbance term, 6i's and dfs are parameters, estimated by Instrumental Variable
 estimation. Standard errors in parentheses are heteroskedastic-consistent. We list the adjusted R2, the
 residual sum of squares and the number of observations. Industry dummy parameters are not reported.
 only 3 firms have substantial ownership by board members. This should be kept in
 mind in interpreting the results printed in Table 5. Analogously to the number of
 insiders, we transformed EQRVB and EQRVC to avoid a loss of observations
 Table 5 (management board panel) shows that equity ownership by manage-
 ment board members does not affect performance; a similar conclusion can be drawn
 from Table 5 (supervisory board panel) for the supervisory board members.
 Finally, we analyze the impact of remuneration per board member on corporate
 performance. As firms in the Netherlands have only recently been required by law to
 publish data on remuneration of supervisory board members we only have data for
 56 of our 94 firms for management board remuneration and for 71 of the 94 firms for
 supervisory board payment. We compute the average remuneration per member.
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 TABLE 5
 Estimation Results for Equity Ownership of the Management Board
 and the Supervisory Board
 Management Board Supervisory Board
 PERFORM MB PERFORM MB
 Ownership Variables
 Log(l+EQRVB) 0.019 -0.302 -2.213 -0.709
 Logd+EQRVC) (0.234) (0.427) (0.258) (0.398)
 Conditioning Variables
 Log(TA) -0.013a 0.005 0.006 0.031
 (0.058) (0.120) (0.033) (0.081)
 L -0.012 0.024 -0.014 0.008
 (0.007) (0.013) (0.006) (0.011)
 CFA/TA 0.025a 0.023 0.025a 0.020
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.012) (0.021)
 DIV 0.028 0.005 0.046 0.056
 (0.046) (0.084) (0.039) (0.079)
 DYN -0.608a -0.756a -0.611a -0.642a
 (0.147) (0.297) (0.142) (0.200)
 SSPI 0.344a 0.208 0.351a 0.234
 (0.090) (0.164) (0.098) (0.174)
 Constant 0.634 0.898 0.927 1.922
 (0.569) (1.064) (0.652) (1.211)
 Number of firms 92 92 92 92
 R2 0.531 0.233 0.510 0.261
 RSS 26.676 78.112 27.967 75.334
 a. significant at 95 percent confidence level.
 The parameter estimates are based on the following equation: P = 60 + (61 log{l+EQRVB\ 61 log(l+EQRVQ)
 + 62 log(TA) +63 L + 64 CFA/TA + 65 DIV + 66 DYN + 67 SSPI + Xdj INDj + e.
 We instrument logd+EQRVB) (log(l+EQRVC)) by AIP1, AIP2, AIP3, AIP4, CONCP, BANK, PINS, NET-
 WORK1 and NETWORK2. P is either PERFORM or market-to-book MB, the other variables are defined
 in Tables 1-3, INDj refers to the industry dummy variables (8 industries in total), e is a disturbance term,
 6¿'s and dfs are parameters, estimated by Instrumental Variable estimation. Standard errors in paren-
 theses are heteroskedastic-consistent. We list the adjusted R2 and the residual sum of squares and the
 number of observations. Industry dummy parameters are not reported.
 Table 6 (management board panel) shows that remuneration of management
 board members has a slightly positive impact (90 percent confidence interval) on the
 PERFORM indicator. When remuneration is used in the (stock) market indicator of
 corporate performance the impact is no longer significant. Table 6 also gives the
 corresponding results for the remuneration per supervisory board member. The su-
 pervisory board panel of the table shows that there is no relation between remunera-
 tion and corporate performance.
 SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
 This paper evaluates the nexus corporate performance board characteristics for
 the Netherlands. The Dutch system of corporate governance is interesting, because
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 Table 6
 Estimation Results for Remuneration per Member of the Management
 Board and Supervisory Board
 Management Board Supervisory Board
 PERFORM MB PERFORM MB
 Variable
 LogiREMUNRVB) 0.753a -0.529 -0.030 -0.688
 LogiREMUNRVC) (0.421) (0.615) (0.301) (0.632)
 Conditioning Variables
 Log(TA) -0.314a 0.026 -0.058 -0.003
 (0.141) (0.221) (0.087) (0.130)
 L 0.008 0.021 -0.010 0.025a
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.006) (0.010)
 CFAITA 0.040a 0.028 0.032a -0.019
 (0.018) (0.025) (0.014) (0.020)
 DIV 0.050 0.087 0.096a 0.088
 (0.047) (0.097) (0.045) (0.082)
 DYN -0.479a -0.595 -0.478a -0.747a
 (0.218) (0.347) (0.166) (0.258)
 SSPI 0.186 0.398 0.326a 0.383a
 (0.076) (0.254) (0.097) (0.148)
 Constant -4.036 3.715 0.647 2.667
 (2.600) (3.241) (0.849) (2.137)
 Number of firms 56 56 71 71
 R2 0.374 0.237 0.509 0.408
 RSS 16.900 48.220 21.296 44.711
 a. Significant at 95 percent confidence level.
 b. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
 The parameter estimates are based on the following equation: P= 60 + (61 log(REMUNRVB), 61
 log(REMUNRVC)) + 62 log(TA) +63 L + 64 CFAITA + 65 DIV + 66 DYN + 67 SSPI + Xdj INDj + e
 We instrument \og(REMUNRVB) (\og(REMUNRVC)) by AIP1 , AIP2, AIP3, AIP4, CONCP, BANK, PINS,
 NETWORK1 and NETWORK2. P is either PERFORM or market-to-book MB, the other variables are
 defined in Tables 1-3, INDj refers to the industry dummy variables (8 industries in total), e is a distur-
 bance term, 6i's and dfs are parameters, estimated by Instrumental Variable estimation. Standard errors
 in parentheses are heteroskedastic-consistent. We list the adjusted R2 and the residual sum of squares
 and the number of observations. Industry dummy parameters are not reported.
 it combines both elements of primarily market orientation (compare the United States
 and UK) and more German-like control mechanisms. In the Netherlands, a two-tier
 board system is prevalent. An important characteristic of supervisory boards (in two
 of the three discussed legal models) is the principle of co-option. This principle is the
 subject of a heated discussion in the Netherlands [Gelauff and den Broeder, 1996].
 We find no evidence of a relationship between performance and the size of the
 management board in the Netherlands. Given the role of the management board and
 its size (3 members) on average we conclude that they perform effectively. The oppo-
 site holds for the size and composition of the supervisory board. We find evidence for
 a negative impact of the size of this board. This supports the findings of Yermack
 [1996] for U.S. companies. Also, the number of outsiders is negatively associated
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 with performance (which is not in line with Hermalin and Weisbach [1991], Bhagat
 and Black [1997; 1998], and Dalton et al. [1998]). This negative relationship, which
 is strongly related to the size, however, suggests that the introduction of more out-
 siders in the supervisory board is not necessarily the best solution to the Berle-Means
 problem of free-ridership of shareholders. The influence of managers on the composi-
 tion of the board may be too substantial. Finally, we find no hard evidence of any
 relation between remuneration of board members and corporate performance.
 Implicitly, we find support for the alleged negative impact of one of the most
 crucial institutional characteristics of Dutch corporate governance: co-option of the
 supervisory board. Through co-option the incumbent members of the supervisory board
 appoint new members. Apparently incumbent members or the managers who influ-
 ence this choice do a bad job. Dutch shareholders are not only relatively poorly pro-
 tected, because of the array of defense mechanisms that is actually used by listed
 firms (only 13 of the 94 firms of our sample don't use any of the researched defense
 instruments), but also have no real influence on the size and composition of supervi-
 sory boards, which are negatively associated with performance.
 NOTES
 1. See, for example, Gugler [1998] for a survey.
 2. See Hermalin and Weisbach [2001] for a survey.
 3. See Kabir, Cantrijn, and Jeunink [ 1997] for similar findings.
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